The Theory and Reality of the European Coal and Steel Community

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Working Paper No. 07-001
January 2007


Thanks to John Gillingham and Andy Moravcsik for their very helpful comments on this chapter, and to the editors for their overall guidance.
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Abstract

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the first step in the process of European integration. Its founders had lofty aspirations that integration in coal and steel would spill into a larger endeavor, and early scholarly analyses suggested that coal and steel integration was spurring more fundamental political change. Looking over the fifty-year history of the ECSC, we find that the problem the ECSC was created to deal with never materialized, and that the tools of the ECSC were barely used until the 1980s. Intervention in the 1980s did not spur deeper political change, even though the conditions which Ernst Haas expected to contribute to deep political change finally existed. Since the ECSC did not in fact do what it was created to do (build a common market in coal and steel), and was not central in the development of the European Coal and Steel industry, the question then becomes how did the ECSC as an institution matter in the process of European integration?
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Introduction

European integration began in 1950 with the Schuman Plan, which launched the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Schuman Plan was designed to alleviate concerns that Germany’s dominance in coal and steel could be used to harm European reconstruction efforts or to build another war machine. Jean Monnet, the Plan’s chief architect, also wanted to shore up the French planning process for reconstruction by Europeanizing the technocratic planning approach. Most supporters of the ECSC project expected integration to expand beyond Coal and Steel, and hoped that it would serve as a first step toward deeper European integration.

European integration theory began with the ECSC as well. Inspired by Monnet’s vision that technical functional integration could lead to political transformation, Ernst Haas created a neo-functionalist theory that specified the mechanisms through which integration would be politically transformative. With governance transferred to the European level, Haas expected the stake-holders associated with the sector to come to see their fate as linked to the ECSC’s success. He predicted that firms, unions and workers benefiting from ECSC policies would support the ECSC. Success would breed success. As other industries observed the benefits of supranational coordination, they would demand integration in their sectors, leading to the realization of Haas’ hope of moving “politics beyond the nation-state” (Haas, 1964, Haas, 1958).

After the European Economic Community was launched in 1958, theoretical and practical interest in the ECSC declined. Integrating European economies was a more ambitious goal, and it was clear early on that agriculture—not coal and steel—would be the first large policy nut that had to be cracked for the European project to succeed. Thus by 1958, practically and politically speaking, the success of the coal and steel project was no longer a bellwether for the larger integration efforts. A number of studies of the ECSC were published in the late 1950s and early 1960s, (Diebold, 1959, Haas, 1958, Scheingold, 1965), but then scholarly focus shifted after the 1960s.1

This chapter examines the experience of Coal and Steel integration during the ECSC’s fifty year history, focusing on the extent to which practice coincided with theory. Like others, we find that ECSC rules were regularly ignored. Our question is what does it mean for integration theory that the ECSC was mainly a paper tiger? Why did Haas’ integration theory not materialize in this case par excellence? Why was the ECJ not the integrating actor in the ECSC that it came to be in the EEC and EU?

We argue that the ECSC failed because the situation for which it was created never materialized, and absent that situation member states actually preferred market segmentation to market integration. Its early failure put to rest the technocratic functional integration approach that inspired the ECSC, and in doing so assured states that integration did not mean ceding power to the High Authority. The ECSC did prove useful when external forces created benefits for working collectively. When the US was concerned about dumping of European steel products, the ECSC assumed its role as foreign representative for the member states. When a global oversupply led to a collapse of the price of steel products, the ECSC was a useful means to manage the painful but necessary market adjustment. However even when the ECSC assumed

1 Geoffrey Dudley and Jeremy Richardson’s 1999 article is a noteworthy exception.
the role Monnet had envisioned, the ECSC did not trigger a shifting of loyalties, spill-over or an entrenchment of supranational institutions and policies. Instead, the ECSC was disbanded.

Section I discusses the ECSC at its founding. Section II divides the ECSC into historical periods demarcated by changes in the economic terms of trade in coal and steel, and thus by critical junctures in which changes in European policy could have and sometimes did occur. Reviewing the entire time trajectory, Section III evaluates the role the ECSC played in post-war European steel and integration politics.

I. The ECSC at its founding

In the immediate post war period, Germany’s European neighbors were concerned that Germany might regain its dominance in steel, and that they would lack the steel they needed to rebuild their economies. While the Allies were occupying Germany, the International Ruhr Authority monitored and controlled Germany’s industry. But by 1949 it was clear that the United States planned to create a sovereign Germany largely free of international oversight and control. Schuman proposed the ECSC to avoid German sovereign control of its industry (Milward, 1984).

At the time the ECSC was proposed, the concern was that a scarcity of steel could advantage Germany, which had the most established steel industry and Ruhr coal. In a context of scarcity, there was a fear that Germany could abuse its dominant position in the market, and other European states could be prevented from rebuilding their industry and economies. Jean Monnet drafted the ECSC treaty with the problem of scarce supply in mind, but with the idea that the ECSC could eventually engage in supranational sectoral planning (Duchêne, 1994). During negotiations over the Treaty of Paris, it became clear that countries were not interested in coordinated sectoral planning. Instead, countries wanted resources they could use to rebuild national industries. French producers fought for favorable access to German coal (Duchêne 1994: 221; Rittberger 2001: 686-688). Belgium, Dutch and Italian firms demanded adjustment subsidies and time to build up their industry (Kipping et al., 2001: 81-5). The Dutch foiled Monnet’s plan to have a highly independent supranational planning body, insisting on creating a Council of Ministers to control the High Authority (Dinan, 2004:51). The end result was a treaty that was far less ambitious than what Schuman had originally proposed (Haas 1958: 251; Milward 1984: 380-420; Groenendijk and Gert 2002: 602).

While the Treaty of Paris ended up an intergovernmentalist bargain, it did establish supranational institutions with real powers, at least on paper. The Council of Ministers, comprised of ministers from member countries, had to formally assent to policy measures initiated by the High Authority (HA), but decisions would originate from the HA, based on a majority vote of the nine members. The HA could fine firms and withhold transfer funds to encourage compliance with ECSC rules. There was also a supranational European Court of Justice (ECJ) to arbitrate disputes among participants including member states, European institutions and affected private actors (e.g. firms, unions etc.). The Treaty also created a “common assembly” made up of national parliamentarians, and umbrella associations for each industry, for employers, and for unions.

In addition to its institutions, the Treaty created a framework of rules that could be used to shore up the competitive nature of the market. Elements of this framework included:
• **Transparency with respect to prices**: firms were obliged to publish prices, and price discrimination was forbidden.

• **Management of investment**: the High Authority could help fund or prohibit investments to avoid illegal subsidization of industry.

• **Banning cartels**: cartels were generally forbidden and the High Authority had to approve that mergers were aimed at increasing efficiency and not at market dominance.

• **Eliminating subsidies**: subsidies were generally illegal, though exceptions were permitted so long as they were gradually reduced.

• **Labor Policy**: information provisions aimed to create transparency in labor practices.

• **Transportation**: the same transport rates had to be applied to all steel firms, regardless of nationality, and rates had to be published.

• **Foreign Relations**: under the supervision of the Council of Ministers, the High Authority could negotiate and establish diplomatic relations with foreign governments regarding matters related to coal and steel.

• **Crisis Measures**: in the event of a “manifest crisis,” production quotas would be established by the High Authority. 2

While Monnet and Schuman had not gotten all they had wanted, the Treaty did establish institutions that could be used to coordinate Europe’s coal and steel industries. Monnet saw sectoral planning “as above all a ‘method’ of mobilizing people for collective effort” and the Schuman Plan as the “first step to a united Europe” (Duchêne, 1994: 157 & 199). Schuman claimed that ECSC would “simply and speedily [create] that fusion of interests…that will be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community” (quoted in Groenendijk and Gert, 2002: 602). Analyzing its first ten years of existence, Ernst Haas found evidence of High Authority influence, of the interpenetration of European steel markets, and of actors below the state organizing to promote common goals. Haas argued in 1958 that “political integration is taking place” (1958: 485). But these interpretations were quite disputable. 3

**II. Critical Junctures in Coal and Steel Integration**

This section assesses the reality of what happened in the European Coal and Steel Community over time. Were the substantive rules followed? Did the institutional mechanisms worked as Haas and Monnet expected (e.g. did policy come to be set at the European level, did the peak associations created to oversee Coal and Steel market integration assume the political role of supranationalizing political representation and loyalties)? Our empirical analysis is

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oriented around four periods, each with a crisis that presented an opportunity to declare a “manifest crisis” which would trigger the ECSC’s provisions to set policy at the European level.

**1950 to 1958: Searching for a Raison d’Être**

The common market for coal, iron-ore and scrap markets was officially opened in February 1953,\(^4\) when members agreed to eliminate tariffs and quotas in accordance with the treaty. But in fact there were no tariffs or quotas at the time protecting markets (Haas, 1958: 60-2; Gillingham, 1991: 268), so this vote was mainly symbolic. To create a real common market, the High Authority would need to tackle the policies and institutions that created barriers to trade, which required Council assent. European governments were most concerned with protecting jobs and facilitating industrial growth—defined exclusively in national terms. These objectives led governments to prefer market segmentation, over unleashing competition via market integration. European governments blocked HA efforts to dismantle barriers to trade, and aided their firms often in contravention of ECSC rules.

**France:** The French government granted low interest state-guaranteed loans to help its industry. Convinced that economies of scale would make its industry competitive, the French orchestrated mergers that arguably cut against the ECSC’s anti-cartel policies (Daley, 1996: 58). While French consumers of steel wanted open markets to gain access to cheaper steel, the government continued to control domestic steel prices, in violation of the ECSC Treaty (Kipping, 1996: 16). The government offset high prices with discounted investment credit, but it did so differentially to develop targeted regions; in some places steel prices were higher than prices in neighboring ECSC states, but in other locations prices were lower than what they might have been if there were an integrated European market (Daley, 1996: 64).

**Germany:** Germany was the only country with highly concentrated ownership in the 1940s. While the German government negotiated with allies regarding deconcentration and complied with ECSC rulings pertaining to Germany industry, it dragged its feet when it came to implementing the anti-cartel spirit of the ECSC’s provisions. Its strategy succeeded. By 1952, efforts to deconcentrate Germany industry were loosened; by 1958, they were abandoned (Warner, 1996: 236). Germany did not have explicit subsidization policies for its steel industry, relying instead on indirect subsidization via special tax credits, relaxed regulatory standards and favorable credit terms (Esser and Fach, 1989: 239). These investment tax incentives were the “private equivalent to the publicly sponsored heavy industry modernization program of the French Plan” (Gillingham 1991: 284).

**Italy:** Italy’s industry was among the least internationally competitive in Europe, though the high cost of transporting German, Belgium or French steel provided a buffer for Italian firms. Italy grew its steel industry in the 1950s through a combination of heavy public sector investment, tariffs, subsidization of scrap inputs, and increased concentration of ownership to create economies of scale (Kipping et al., 2001, Villa, 1986: 169). The legal authority for these policies were negotiated as part of the ECSC negotiations, where Italy and Belgium won the right to maintain protection during a five year transition period (Milward, 1984: 408). Italy’s exceptions to ECSC rules continued, however, past the five year transition period. Italy was thus able to develop its industry rapidly, increasing production from 3 million metric tons in 1951, to 9 million plus tons in 1961, to 12.7 million tons in 1965 (Kipping et al., 2001: 86).

\(^4\) A market for “ordinary steel” opened in May 1953, and after delays the market for “alloyed steel” opened in August 1954.
The ECSC: So what were ECSC institutions doing while its rules and provisions were by-passed? In the 1950s, European countries were not focused on exporting steel. Rather, national industries primarily served national markets. This made it easy for the ECSC to eliminate national policies on the books that were blatantly discriminatory (e.g. formal rules setting different taxation rates or prices for national versus foreign steel, export subsidies etc). The High Authority also monitored markets and worked to increase transparency in transportation and selling prices, requiring that prices be posted. Despite its efforts, discriminatory railroad rates continued providing a hidden subsidy for local producers (Diebold, 1959: 175-7). Firms also continued to sell their product at prices that differed from the advertised price.

The High Authority also conducted studies and published reports. In a 1954 report the HA admitted that its price transparency efforts were failing as non-compliance with ECSC price policies was more the norm than the exception. Unable to crack down on cheating, the HA instead created the “Monnet margin” for prices to deviate up to 2.5% from the published prices. William Diebold saw the policy change as a sign the ECSC was unable to implement its rules (1959: 258); Haas by contrast argued that the “Monnet Margin” showed the ECSC was flexible (1958: 195, 203). French and Italians steel producers did not like the “Monnet Margin,” and they challenged it in front of the ECJ, which declared the Monnet Margin illegal (Scheingold, 1965: 54-70). Indeed many contentious HA decisions were challenged by firms and states, ending up as cases heard by the ECJ, creating an irony—the only actor truly being held to ECSC rules was the HA.

Why were the ECSC policies not enforced? First, as an empirical reality, the problems the ECSC was created to solve quickly disappeared on their own. The 1950s was a sellers market for steel, but supply was not critically scarce. Access to German coking coal—France’s main economic motivation for establishing the ECSC—proved to not be important because technological advances reduced transport costs, and American coking coal was abundant and cheap (Gillingham 1991: 188, 230, 357). While German industry remained cartelized, and implicitly subsidized through cozy relationships with banks (Katzenstein, 1987, Zysman, 1983), German industry was in no position to dominate the European market. Second, the ECSC was not set up to deal with government policies that created the main sources of market distortions—exchange rate policy, national regulatory rules, and government’s low interest loans to industry. Finally, there was simply no real interest in creating market competition. As long as national policies did not create negative externalities that flowed across borders, member states saw no role for ECSC institutions in facilitating market adjustments.

The political momentum created by the early ECSC was far different than what Monnet had expected. In 1954, France rejected treaties aimed at creating a European Political Community and a European Defense Community, refusing to accept greater supranationalism. The model of technical functional integration was also rejected when proposals for a transport community and an atomic energy union were refused (Moravcsik, 1998: Chapter 2). Instead, states agreed to build a broader European Economic Community (EEC). EEC institutions were weaker than their ECSC counter-parts. For example, where the ECSC allowed the High Authority to create fines for non-compliance, and withhold transfer payments to non-complying states and firms, the Treaty of Rome only allowed the Commission to raise infringement suits, which could lead to a toothless ECJ declaration that a “member state had failed to fulfill its obligation.” Karen Alter identifies a number of options available to member states had they wanted stronger enforcement mechanisms for the common market. That they chose none of the
options, she argues, “was no accident.” (Alter, 2001: 8). Member states wanted for the EEC less, not more, supranationalism than they had in the ECSC.


In 1959, the European steel sector entered recession and the European coal sector experienced a severe crisis of oversupply and falling world prices. The High Authority asked member states to declare a “manifest crisis” for the coal industry. Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands wanted ECSC help in dealing with the coal crisis, but Germany, France and Italy refused to authorize the High Authority action plan. They agreed to aid measures for Belgium but argued that national governments, rather than supranational actors, should determine the best way to deal with the crisis. Their veto, issued just at the time of publication of Ernst Haas’ *The Uniting of Europe*, in some ways was the death knell for the ECSC. The High Authority could not enforce ECSC rules, nor adjust them, nor could it make itself useful when a European-wide crisis erupted.

In the 1960s, Europe faced more challenges—a continued oversupply of coal, then iron ore, then steel followed by the rise of foreign competition in raw inputs and in steel outputs. At the same time as international competition increased, car firms switched to thinner sheet steel, and concrete construction began using less iron. The ECSC was created for robust demand combined with scarce supply, not falling demand. Member states refused to adapt ECSC institutions to the changing market realities. In the face of a proposal to merge the three EEC treaties (the Common Market, EURATOM and ECSC Treaties), the High Authority published a document, informally known as “the last will and testament of the ECSC.” Member states responded by declaring the importance of the ECSC, yet refusing to work with the HA to address challenges in the steel industry. Each of the large countries had their own reasons for rejecting a supranational approach. De Gaulle opposed supranational solutions in principle, claiming a preference for different plans for each country. Germany did not want a move towards a centrally controlled economy. Benelux and Italy disagreed about the specific policies and tools the High Authority recommended, in part because their market competitiveness differed.

France—Despite investments in modernization, French firms entered the European recession uncompetitive compared to their European neighbors. For example, in 1966, French firms took 16.4 hours to produce a ton of steel, but Germany only needed 12.7 hours and Italy 10.0 hours (Daley 1996: 61). Among the sources of French inefficiency were a failure to specialize, a refusal to close plants using outdated technology, combined with an unwillingness to invest in new technologies (Daley 1996: 61-63). Market forces might have forced rapid economic rationalization, but with a growing desire to protect jobs, the French government instead poured more resources into its industry. It kept uncompetitive firms alive with state subsidies or loans, meanwhile it encouraged modest consolidation and rationalization in the industry by orchestrating mergers that closed some uncompetitive production while injecting investment funds into “national champions” using the latest production technologies (Howell et al., 1988).

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7 Ibid.
Germany- The German government generally let the Coal and Steel industries, in consultation with German banks, work out difficulties they encountered. Government subsidies to industry were fairly low from 1960 to 1970, at least relative to others, such as Italy (Harris 1983: 179). The exception to this rule was the German government’s rescue of the ailing Krupp firm in 1967. German firms rode out economic upheaval through “market coordination,” which resembled cartel policy-making. Banks would lend to steel industries in times of crises, and firms signed multi-year arrangements where they agreed to share rather than compete for the market. German firms regularly agreed to reduce or postpone production in return for other firms’ agreeing to buy from them or withhold production in the future (Shonfield, 1969: 256-7).

Italy- Italy lacked domestic sources of raw inputs for steel, and thus large integrated steel firms. Firms in the North focused on electric furnace technology, creating small “minimills” that specialized in the production of simple products for local and regional usage. Minimills flourished at the same time integrated steel suffered, because they focused on the most profitable needs of local consumers (Barnett and Crandall, 1986: Chapters 1 & 2). But consumption demand outstripped supply of steel in Italy in the 1960s (Villa, 1986: 169). Italy could have, of course, relied on the international market for this supply. Indeed with a fall in transportation prices, it would have been cheaper for Italy to simply import the products it needed. But with a national demand unmet, the Italian government opted for a more interventionist investment strategy that created jobs and economic growth in the Christian Democrat’s political stronghold—the Mezzogiorno South. This decision created an economic liability Italians would be saddled with for the next thirty years (Brusoni and Orsenigo, 1997).

The ECSC- If all countries were pursuing their own policies, what was the ECSC doing? The High Authority developed recommendations to deal with the crisis, but most of its efforts were rejected by member states. It could find support for small, isolated projects. For example in the 1970s, the ECSC helped address a lack of iron ore by helping build private harbors for imports. The High Authority also found some funds to grant modernization loans, and it

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10 In the 1960s a new steel plant was built in Taranto, owned by Finsider which was 99.82% owned by the state holding company IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) Howell, T. R., Noellert, W. A., Kreier, J. G. & Wolff, A. W. (1988) Steel and the State: Government Intervention and Steel's Structural Crisis, Boulder, Westview Press.


created a system of welfare guarantees for workers who lost their job. Its studies on the labor market provided information for unions to use to support their case for retraining programs, worker compensation, and improved worker conditions (Collins, 1975: 100-7). According to Gilbert Mathieu, the High Authority’s policies did not affect industrial development, but its coordination (and, one might add, blind eye) arguably made it easier for each country to obtain supplies when short while avoiding cutbacks during periods of oversupply (Mathieu, 1970).

Beyond these specific policies, the ECSC played two roles in this period. First, from 1953 to 1963 ECSC institutions (mainly the ECJ) provided a forum for actors to challenge policies in other countries that harmed them. In a number of cases, firms or governments of one country were challenging policies that conferred competitive advantages on firms in another country.

Second, the ECSC was the external voice of European countries in negotiations over dumping steel. In the 1960s, declining transportation rates and the rise of new production technologies created problems for all traditional producers of steel (Warren, 1975). Responding to the economic distress of US steel producers, the United States pressured Europe and Japan to voluntarily restrain their exports of steel to the US. The US negotiated this agreement with the EEC; presumably member states agreed to common representation to avoid a US retaliation that might affect them all (McClenahan, 1991).

This period ended with a boom phase (1968-1974)—rising prices, rising consumption, extensive expansion plans and bright horizons for the industry. Countries could well imagine that their intervention had contributed to the recovery. Buoyed by optimistic market projections in the 1970s, national governments redoubled their efforts to invest in and modernize their steel industries, contributing to a vast over production and the crisis of the 1970s.

1974-1986- The High Authority (now the Commission) Gets Support for Market Coordination

The international iron and steel industry faced a world wide crisis starting in 1974, triggered by the rising price of energy, decreased world consumption of steel, and world wide overcapacity as developing countries created their own steel industries and began exporting cheap steel. Oversupply created a collective problem for European countries, which was exacerbated when the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973. Firms wanted to protect jobs, and the incremental cost of producing steel was such that firms had an incentive to keep producing even though it contributed further to the collapse in the price for steel. In the first year

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13 Op cit. note 11.
14 German steel producers engaged in a five-year legal battle against Italy for the latter’s failure to publish trucking rates—a policy which benefited Italian producers at the expense of German ones (Scheingold 1965: ch. 8). The Dutch coal association successfully challenged the German “miners bonus” in 1956, which conferred a considerable competitive advantage on this industry relative to others. Still, even after the ECJ ruled the subsidy illegal in 1961, it took years of prodding from the HA before Germany finally repealed the policy in 1964 Scheingold, S. (1965) The Rule of Law in European Integration, New Haven, Yale University Press.. The stream of Coal and Steel cases pretty much dried up in the 1960s. The ECJ heard 226 Coal and Steel cases from 1953-1963, and an average of 31 cases per year from 1958 to 1963. The ECJ averaged 5.5 ECSC cases from 1964-1969, perhaps because the HA was not making much policy worth contesting Scheingold, S. (1971) The Law in Political Integration: The Evolution and Integrative Implications of Regional Legal Processes in the European Community. Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Cambridge Massachusetts..
of the crisis, internal EU steel prices fell by 40% and export prices dropped 50% (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1985: 212).

A number of European countries wanted to follow the U.S. approach to oversupply: setting minimum prices combined with quotas to avoid firms overproducing. Germany opposed strong market intervention, so the ECSC’s 1976 “Spinelli approach” mainly monitored the market, with the expectation that the crisis was merely a cyclical adjustment (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1985: 215). Needing a stronger policy, the 1976-77 “Simonet Plan” included regional aids, protection against third countries, and recommended steel prices (Daley 1996: 149; Tsoukalis and Strauss 1987: 199-201).

To help reach price targets, a European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries, EUROFER, was created in 1976. Working through EUROFER was voluntary, but to create a real power for EUROFER the Commission agreed to only bargain and distribute production quotas via negotiations with EUROFER.15

As reality set in that the steel market would not recover to pre-1974 consumption levels (let alone consumption growth), they came to support a communal approach to deal with oversupply of steel in Europe and the world. EC Minister Davignon’s 1977 Plan marked a new era for the ECSC: the steel industry became actively managed at the Community level and the Commission for the first time became a “relevant actor” from the perspective of national firms and policymakers (Grunert, 1987: 233-4).

Davignon’s first plan created common external trade barriers; required detailed production, employment and delivery forecasts from firms; set minimum prices and production quotas; and granted aid on the condition it was coupled with capacity reductions. These efforts were only partially successful. Competitive firms in the Bresciani region of Italy, as well as some French and German firms, refused to follow the restrictions, creating “rebates” and “accidentally” delivering more steel than was requested (Jones, 1979: 50-1).16 While national governments voiced support for European policy-making, they continued to bail out their industries, in the hope that the market would recover. In 1980, the US accused European firms of “dumping” steel, causing a decline in exports to the US at the same time that auto companies further reduced the amount of steel in their products to obtain fuel efficiencies. These two events led the European market into another price war (Howell et al., 1988: 80), which prompted the Commission to ask the Council to declare a “manifest crisis.”

The 1981 vote declaring a “manifest crisis” led to the second Davignon plan, and the creation of EUROFER II. From a legal standpoint, a “manifest crisis” authorized the adoption of extensive measures, such as mandatory production quotas covering about 80% of all steel products and regulations regarding subsidies (Grunert 1987: 235). The resurrection of cartels as a major component of the Davignon strategy shows how far the ECSC strayed from the hopes of Monnet, for whom eliminating cartels was a chief aim (Duchêne 1994: 213; Gillingham 1991: 232).

From a political standpoint, it is not clear what changed with the declaration of a “manifest crisis.” Compliance with ECSC rules regarding prices, quotas and subsidies remained problematic because national governments continued to rescue their own industry. According to Kent Jones, only a market readjustment, raising input prices so that firms’ profit-maximizing price fell in line with cartel rules, ended the cheating regarding European price policies (Jones 1996: 149).

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15 Based on an interview with the director of the European Steel Association (EUROFER). Brussels September 7, 2004.
16 The Commission fined about 20 firms in 1978-9 for infringing on price rules.
1986: 127-128). Indeed it is quite telling that in a general book on “Steel and the State,” the chapter on “The European Community” spends forty-eight pages talking about European level policies, and then eighty pages describing the steel policies of the member states that are basically unrelated to ECSC policy. For example, the ECSC, under German pressure, created rules limiting subsidies at the same time as the French nationalized their industry so as to bail it out, the Italians poured aid into its firms owned by the state holding company IRI (Howell et al., 1988).

The crisis did not per se make a growing Commission role inevitable. The High Authority’s request that the Council declare a “manifest crisis” for coal in 1958, its numerous policy suggestions in the 1960s, and even the French request for such a declaration in 1975 had been rejected despite having the support of different member states at different times. Declaring a “manifest crisis” was easier in 1981 for a few reasons.

First, it had become clear that demand for steel would not recover to its pre-1974 levels both because consumption patterns had changed and because developing countries now could compete in the international market place. With this realization came a common diagnosis of the problem and agreement about what was needed to deal with the crisis. All agreed that European production of steel needed to be permanently reduced, and integrated steel production—being no longer an economically profitable—was where reductions had to occur (Dudley and Richardson 1999: 245; Grunert 1987; Daley 1996: 148; Tsoukalis and Strauss 1985).

Second, the duration of the crisis meant that governments had a chance to attempt to solve the problem on their own. National policies from 1976 to 1981 were both expensive and ineffective. Governments were frustrated that firms continually undermined their efforts through continued production. With little good news to claim credit for, European governments became more willing to turn the problem over to the European level, which allowed national politicians to pin the blame for the pain inflicted on unelected EEC officials (Tsoukalis and Strauss 1985, 1987).

Third, an international politics of steel had emerged. Falling transportation prices had created a competitive international market in steel for the first time in the late 1960s. When supply outstripped demand in Europe, European firms had looked for international outlets for their goods. They faced strong rebuke from countries that charged European countries with dumping products on their markets. The political bargaining regarding dumping and countervailing duties took place in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Within GATT, the EEC was treated as a regional organization, which provided EEC states with beneficial exemptions. Its status as a regional organization also put the EEC on the potential collective receiving end of collective dumping and counter-vailing duty charges. Within the GATT, the EEC Commission continued its role begun in the 1960s as the interlocutor in negotiations with foreign governments—a role which dovetailed with the general trend to grant trade negotiation authority to the Commission in this period (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 1999, Meunier, 2003).

Fourth, there was a sunset clause of the ECSC Treaty which was not too far off. As long as the ECSC Treaty was not extended beyond its original fifty years, states could grant the Commission extraordinary powers without being concerned that the Commission would continue to erode member state authority. In yet another irony, it was not the promised effectiveness of the ECSC’s supranational institutions that led to their usage, but nearly the opposite—the fact that they could not be powerful in the future—that facilitated the granting of extraordinary powers to the Commission.
Europe used its massive intervention in the 1980s to shut down its integrated steel plants, restructure local economies, and develop mini-mill capacity to produce highly specialized steel products. The interventionist policies continued until 1986, and a bit longer in member states that joined the EEC in the mid 1980s. The bail-out was stated as the last and final major subsidy to the industry, and was coupled with privatization policies that allowed governments to extricate themselves from direct involvement in steel production.17

1987-1994 – Downsizing the European Effort

By the 1980s, the ECSC’s intervention had finally achieved some of the goals Haas had identified in 1958. There were true EEC level peak associations representing industry and workers, with real power to negotiate with the Commission to set price and output targets. There were coal- and steel-related labor policies that improved the welfare of workers (Collins, 1975: 100-7). Finally, there was momentum behind the ECSC, and coincidentally behind the integration endeavor more generally. Thus, at the conclusion of the crisis, many observers expected the demand for ECSC intervention to continue and for the experience of collective industrial management to spur on supranationalism and European integration (Grunert, 1987, Mény and Wright, 1987: 91). But this episode did not foment more of the same. Schuman’s expected “fusion of interests” and Haas’ expected “shifting of loyalties” never materialized despite clear government support for ECSC policies.

When steel once again went into recession in the early 1990s, firms in Italy, Spain, Portugal and East Germany demanded Commission intervention. They were not ECSC converts as much as they were, as always, wanting state support. This time, however, states refused to empower European institutions to act. In the 1980s, Germany had been alone in its opposition to the Davignon Plan’s heavy market intervention.18 But Margaret Thatcher had assumed power in the United Kingdom, and François Mitterrand had embraced the market in France, providing Helmut Kohl with political allies. With neo-liberal free market ideas in ascent, advocates of free markets, who viewed the supranational interventions associated with the Treaty of Paris as a thing of the past, became dominant in both the Commission and most national governments (Dudley and Richardson, 1999). As a result, in this crisis, the coalition favoring free markets was able to prevail over advocates of supranational interventionism.

In March 1991 the Commission declared that the ECSC would end on schedule in 2002, and the coal and steel sector would be absorbed into the EEC (Groenendijk and Gert, 2002). National governments gladly assented, as they were tired of supporting steel and were looking for a way out of their expensive subsidization policy.19 By 1994, the ECSC ceased granting loans to industry for investment. By the time the Treaty of Paris reached its 50 year end, little subsisted of it anyway. Its competition policy and external representation in international negotiations were fully absorbed into the Common Market structure. Because it no longer gave industry any loans, the ECSC’s remaining financial mechanisms were generating funds that were disbursed for research and development, and objectives distantly related to coal and steel.

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19 Based on interviews with the Deputy Head of Unit in Trade Defense instruments, and a member of the Commission’s DG Enterprise, who was involved with the EC’s Steel policy in the 1980s. Brussels September 7, 2004.
ECSC disappeared, largely without notice, as member states focused on the monetary union, enlargement, and their many other policy concerns.

**III. What role did the ECSC play in post-war European politics?**

Assessing the role of the ECSC in European integration is challenging. Ernst Haas noted an increasing interpenetration of coal and steel imports as evidence that a common market existed (Haas, 1958: 63). But writing on the history of the ECSC up until 1958, William Diebold found little evidence that the ECSC per se changed either the pattern of production or the pattern of European trade in coal and steel (Diebold, 1959: 590). Writing on the same topic thirty years later John Gillingham agreed:

> [The ECSC] neither reformed prevailing business practices, produced a new relationship between public authority and private power, nor shifted the locus of economic policy, even as regards heavy industry, from national state to supranational agency. The economic impact of the community was slight. Few of its policies had demonstrable effect (Gillingham, 1991: 300).

Even after the heavy intervention of the Commission in the 1980s, it is hard to say that the ECSC has left a stamp on the face of the European steel industry that would not exist otherwise. Thus asking the counterfactual question of “how would EU steel industries look different were there no ECSC” does not reveal a significant institutional imprint.

One can identify several ways in which the ECSC experience mattered. The prime purpose of the ECSC was to assure European countries that Germany would not again become an abusive dominant force on the continent. While there were many factors contributing to Germany’s post war industrial and political policies, the assurance the ECSC provided remained politically important. John Gillingham points out that despite the many failings of the ECSC, the “Schuman Plan…ended the competitive bids for heavy industry domination that had wrecked every previous large-scale attempt to reorganize the Continent since 1918, led to Westintegration and Franco-German partnership, and resulted in the creation of a new entity, Europe” (1991, 364).

Foundational elements of the ECSC’s institutional blueprint also endured. The Treaty of Paris became the “boiler plate” text in negotiations for the common market. While subsequent agreements tended to strip away elements of the supranational bodies’ powers, features of European integration endured. For example, the ECJ’s preliminary ruling mechanism was transferred wholesale from the ECSC to the European legal system (Pescatore, 1981), a transfer that proved extremely important in the development of the European Union (Weiler, 1991). The legacy of High Authority failure was also a potential benefit. The ECSC showed that the Council of Ministers could control the High Authority (now Commission), and that rules would only be enforced to the extent countries wanted them enforced.

The ECSC did become a venue in which policies towards steel were discussed and sometimes implemented. But the ECSC remained throughout its entire history a framework of convenience, to be used when there was a coalition of support for collective responses and ignored when the support faded. Indeed weaving the ECSC into the story of European integration more generally reveals “critical disjunctures.” The drive to deepen integration signaled by the ratification of the Treaty of Rome was coupled with a decision not to grant the HA’s wish to declare a “manifest crisis” to deal with the coal crisis of 1958. The agreement to declare a “manifest crisis” in 1981 came well before the Common Market was relaunched, and by the time the Single European Act was going forward, support for significant ECSC
intervention in the economy had evaporated. These couplings represent a shifting over time in
the taste for market forces versus government intervention, not for more or less integration. They
also reveal that the coalitions of support for integration were not that deep; there was no
constituency for integration per se, just a constituency for or against specific policies. These
disjunctures may also have been politically significant. The High Authority’s willingness to step
back, and look the other way when states did not want intervention may have provided assurance
that made further integration more palatable.

The history of the ECSC teaches us two main lessons. First, the actual history of the
ECSC highlights the role of external forces in promoting European cooperation. The impetus for
the ECSC was internal to European politics. If not for the larger geo-political concern about
German dominance, it is doubtful that states would have been negotiating about the details of a
common market in coal and steel. Once the threat of German dominance in coal and steel was
gone, there was no impetus to integrate. Firms were quite happy to segment European markets
to avoid competition, and European governments were happy to protect and subsidize national
production. The HA only came to play its supranational role in response to externally imposed
challenges. When the US wanted a partner to coordinate with to avoid “dumping” by European
firms in its market, the HA assumed its foreign affairs role. When global oversupply created a
need to coordinate production and close segments of the industry, the ECSC again played a role.
Thus the actual history of the ECSC followed a “second image reversed” process, where the
realization of the ECSC’s political structure and policies were caused by forces emerging from
the international political economy of the steel sector (Gourevitch, 1978).

Second, the existence of multilateral mechanisms cannot be taken as evidence for
multilateral politics. Today many scholars are suggesting that European culture and position in
the world leads Europeans to like international law and international approaches that Americans
do not (Kagan, 2002, Rubenfeld, 2003). In this light, it is interesting to note that the strong
formal supranational powers for the steel sector were rarely embraced or used in the ECSC’s
history. The HA did not set European steel policy, nor did the ECJ play serve as force of
integration. The ECSC’s legal and political history suggests that there is nothing uniquely
“European” about the international rule of law working—European countries are quite capable of
ignoring common rules, avoiding legal mechanisms, pursuing national interests, and maintaining
a reality that is quite distant to what exists on paper. Just like Americans.

International Rule of Law in Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.


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