Saba Mahmood and Peter G. Danchin

Immunity or Regulation?
Antinomies of Religious Freedom

Introduction

The right to religious liberty is often assumed to be a neutral legal instrument designed to protect the right of individuals and groups, particularly religious minorities, to practice their beliefs freely without state coercion and threat of social discrimination. Yet a comparative reading of the jurisprudence from Egyptian courts and the European Court of Human Rights shows that it is a far more ambiguous instrument that often legitimates, rather than simply alleviates, discriminatory practices of the state against religious minorities. At issue is the European formulation of the right to religious liberty—also enshrined in Egyptian law—that distinguishes between the right to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” in Article 9(1) and the right to “manifest one’s religion or beliefs” in Article 9(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The former, referred to as the forum internum, is held to be absolute, while the latter, the forum externum, is stated to be subject to limitations where necessary to protect public order, morals, or the rights of others. As we show in this essay, the second clause of the right to religious liberty authorizes
the state to intervene in what appears to be mere expressions of religious belief but in fact involves the state in making substantive judgments about religion, a domain toward which it claims to be neutral. This paradox haunts the jurisprudence of the Egyptian courts as much as the European Court of Human Rights. Even though the former seeks to uphold the principles of the sharia and the latter understands itself to be secular, both systems face irreconcilable conflicts in maintaining that religious belief is immune from state intervention while at the same time sanctioning its outward expression. In both cases the courts have tended to privilege the values and sensibilities of the majority religion and discriminate against minority faiths through recourse to the secular concept of public order.

In what follows, we explore this tendency in the reasoning and judgments of cases involving religious minorities in Europe and Egypt. The European Court judgments we discuss involve secular states such as Turkey, Switzerland, and France as well as states such as Italy and Greece with strongly Christian national profiles. In comparison, Egypt is a self-avowedly Islamic state that regards the Islamic sharia to be the source of all its laws even though its legal tradition is based on European (primarily French) law. These important differences notwithstanding, the deployment of the term public order in all the judgments we analyze produces two effects: one, it authorizes the state’s intervention in the domain of religious belief that it declares to be autonomous and sacrosanct; two, it privileges the values and commitments of the religious majority as the norm against which the religious practices of the minority are judged and sanctioned. Rather than understand these two aspects to be a result of the misapplication of the right to religious liberty or the religious personality of certain states, in this essay we argue that they are a product of the contradictions and antinomies internal to the conceptual architecture of the right itself.

Following the recent critical scholarship on secularism, our assumption throughout this essay is that the secular and the religious are not opposites of each other but are closely intertwined in paradigmatic ways in modern nation-states (see, e.g., Agrama 2012; Asad 2003; Baubérot 2000; Connolly 1999; Keane 2007; Taylor 2009). The emergence of the modern category of the secular (in contrast with the premodern Latin term saeculum) is constitutively related to the rise of the modern concept of religion wherein it is impossible to track the history of one without simultaneously tracking the history of the other. Throughout modern history, secularism, as a principle of state governance, has entailed less the separation of religion from politics (as is often assumed) than the ongoing regulation of religion through state
and civic institutions that constantly entwine religion with politics. Through this process has emerged a modular conception of religiosity and a concomitant religious subject that animates various secular discourses, including the juridical, cultural, ethical, and political. The nation-state and its laws are the primary vectors for disseminating this normative religiosity. Importantly, this dissemination occurs in not only non-Western societies whose level of secularity is often questioned but also those regarded as paradigmatically secular, such as the United States, France, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Thus the problem of religious (in)tolerance cannot be simply understood as a product of cultural and social values but must address how modern technologies of secular governance contribute to its ongoing life in modern societies.

The first half of the essay focuses on Egyptian jurisprudence produced on the status of the Bahai minority, who constitute a relatively small proportion of the population (less than 1 percent), but offer the most significant challenge to the constitutionally guaranteed right to religious liberty. Unlike Judaism and Christianity, which the Egyptian state formally recognizes, the practice of the Bahai faith is prohibited in Egypt, a ban that places certain limits on the civil and political rights of the Bahais. Bahais have legally challenged this ban with increasing frequency in recent years with limited success. We analyze several of the judgments issued by Egyptian administrative courts that try to reconcile the right to freedom of belief that the constitution guarantees with the state’s right to limit the public expression of the Bahai faith. In the second half of the essay we turn to the analysis of key cases in the jurisprudence of the European Court in which the principle of religious liberty and public order is invoked, including the well-known Lautsi, Dahlab, Refah Partisi, Şahin, Kokkinakis, and Otto-Preminger-Institut judgments. While attentive to the differences between these cases, we want to point to the striking similarities and the conundrums entailed in regulating religious minorities across the Western and non-Western divide given the contradictions inherent in the concept of the right itself.

The Unrecognizability of Bahais

The Bahai faith is relatively new, originating in Iran in the late nineteenth century as an offshoot of Islam that rejects the finality of Muhammad’s prophecy and the Koran—two of Islam’s cardinal principles—while accepting their sacrality, thereby putting Bahaism outside the doctrinal fold of Islam. The founder of the faith, Bahaullah, declared himself to be a prophet
and set down his own principles of the Bahai faith in the *Holy Book* (*Kitab al-Aqdas*). Despite persecution, Bahais have won converts throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Europe and are currently estimated to be six to seven million adherents globally. The Bahai administrative structure is akin to a corporate model, with vertical hierarchies that are integrated horizontally through a network of globally dispersed Bahai communities. At the top sits the Universal House of Justice, located in Haifa, Israel, also known as the Bahai World Center, which is the spiritual and administrative locus of the Bahai faith. Given modern geopolitical tensions between Israel and most Middle Eastern states, the location of their headquarters in Haifa has often made Bahais a national security threat in the eyes of these governments (see Cole 1998).

Bahais have been living in Egypt since the 1860s when a small number arrived to proselytize secretly and won a few converts from Islam as well as Judaism and Christianity. Their numbers have remained small even though in the 1920s they flourished, establishing a temple and petitioning the government to recognize them as an official religion with its own family law. Their fortunes turned in the 1960s, however, as the tensions between Egypt and Israel escalated and President Gamal Abdel Nasser passed a presidential decree (Law 263/1960) that dissolved Bahai institutions and criminalized their activities. After an initial failed attempt to challenge the decree, the Bahais ceased all efforts to have the Egyptian state recognize their religion and have continued to practice their faith under the public radar. It is not surprising, however, that the Bahais have periodically encountered the state’s administrative bureaucracy, given that it rules over all aspects of a citizen’s life, from the most intimate to the most public. The primary site where Bahais encounter the state’s discriminatory powers is in civil and family law: when Bahais have to acquire civil documents from the Ministry of Interior, or register births and marriages, and settle custody and inheritance claims in family law courts. Some of the recent legal cases have centered on the controversial Egyptian law that requires citizens to declare their religious affiliation on national identity cards. Given that only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are accorded formal recognition, when Bahais have tried to list their religion on their identity cards, it creates a legal conundrum for the Egyptian state. If the state permits Bahais to register their religion on an official document, it amounts to a de facto recognition of their faith; but if the state does not permit them to do so, then it forces Bahais to list their religious identity as Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, which constitutes a lie—itself a violation of state law.
The Egyptian government’s refusal to grant state recognition to the Bahai faith is a complicated issue. Notably, President Nasser’s criminalization of the Bahais in 1960 was based on a presidential decree that provided no religious or legal justification and was primarily understood to be a result of Nasser’s national security policy toward Israel and the increasing animosity between the two states. Since the Bahai administrative-spiritual center was located in Haifa, Nasser’s government came to view Bahais as potential collaborators and informants for the state of Israel. While Bahai community and religious property was seized, most ordinary Bahais continued to conduct their daily affairs in Egypt unless they had to go before the courts to settle particular kinds of claims in which their religious identity was consequential. In response to Bahai legal challenges, the Egyptian courts (administrative and family law courts) have produced a checkered jurisprudence, often invoking not only the presidential decree of 1960 but also Islamic sharia that ostensibly does not recognize religions other than the three monotheistic faiths—Islam, Christianity, Judaism—collectively referred to as “heavenly religions” (al-adyan al-samawiyyah), or “recognized religions” (mu’tarif biha), and their adherents as “People of the Book” (ahl al-kitab). “People of the Book” were accorded a special legal status by various Islamic empires under the pact of ahl al-dhimma that obliged the state to extend protection to their life, property, and right to worship in exchange for which they pledged their loyalty to the ruler and paid a special poll tax. This system was slowly dissolved with the establishment of the nation-state and its promise of civil and political equality. Yet an important aspect of it lives on in Egypt in the juridical autonomy “People of the Book” are accorded over personal status or family law. While most of Egyptian Jews left the country after the establishment of the state of Israel, it is Christian family law that is most consequential to the conduct of minority affairs, particularly of Coptic Orthodox Christians, who constitute over 10 percent of the population. For those religious minorities outside this entente—the Bahais but also the increasingly visible Shia minority—the possibility of gaining formal state recognition seems slim. A significant difficulty lies in the necessary relationship posited between the religious status of a community and its autonomy over family law: to extend state recognition to these groups would require government bodies to enforce aspects of that religion that govern personal status issues.

In the last three decades when Bahais have taken their case to the Egyptian courts, they have encountered the argument that the state’s recognition of the Bahai religion is a violation of the sharia, which, according to Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution, is the source of all laws in Egypt.
This position, however, cannot be historically justified because there is no consensus in the sharia about how to treat religious minorities that hail from traditions other than the three Abrahamic faiths. Under Islamic empires, a variety of different arrangements existed regarding non-Muslims. While the populations living under Ottoman rule were primarily Muslim, Christian, and Jewish, in other parts of the world Muslim rulers had to contend with a variety of nonmonotheistic faiths that were indigenous to the lands they conquered (such as Zoroastrians, Hindus, Buddhists). The Islamic empires could not afford to treat these religious groups as juridical nonentities, heretics, unbelievers, or apostates, but had to integrate them into the state’s economic and governing structures. This historical heterogeneity of sharia norms notwithstanding, Egyptian courts of the modern period have refused to extend formal recognition to the Bahai faith, justifying their stance through recourse to a supposedly singular and unified interpretation of the sharia regarding the status of non-Abrahamic religions within a Muslim polity.

There is a further complication to the Egyptian courts’ assertion of compliance with the sharia. In postcolonial Egypt, sharia rules pertain only to family law and are supposed to have no direct application in administrative, criminal, or civil law. As a result, when Bahai cases have come up in administrative or criminal courts, they fall under the domain of civil law that contains few if any religious injunctions. The administrative courts’ invocation of putative sharia norms therefore is often justified through recourse to the problematic and unwieldy Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution that declares Islamic sharia to be the chief source of all legislation. Not only is this formulation of Article 2 relatively new (1979), but in the absence of legislative and executive guidelines about how to interpret it, the jurisprudence on Article 2 is markedly ad hoc. Clark Lombardi (2006), in his book on the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court’s Article 2 jurisprudence, shows that initially the SCC deferred to the executive branch to provide guidance on how to implement Article 2. Following the executive’s failure, the SCC has made an attempt to articulate a theory of legal interpretation for Article 2 that exhibits two key features: (1) it confers broad authority to SCC justices to pronounce on religious matters (rather than to religious scholars [ulama] familiar with historical sharia jurisprudence); and (2) seeks to reconcile existing secular laws of the state with what it interprets to be the “universal rulings” and “goals” of the sharia (the former prohibiting any conflicting statutory rule and the latter requiring ijtihad [a form of Islamic legal reasoning] to develop presumptive rulings advancing the collective goals of the
This is a tricky enterprise, since none of the Egyptian judges are trained in Islamic jurisprudence, nor is the vast majority of Egyptian law based on the sharia. The ambiguities of what it means to interpret Article 2 compound because Egypt’s lower courts—including the administrative courts where most of the Bahai cases have been litigated—have little or no relation to the SCC, nor do the lower court justices use SCC judgments as precedents for their rulings. Given this situation, it is far from clear what it means to evoke “principles of the sharia.”

To pronounce on matters they are ill equipped to judge or interpret, the administrative court judges increasingly resort to the principle of “public order” to address the status of non-Muslims (including Bahais). It would be easy to regard the use of public order in these cases as an instrumental use of an otherwise secular principle that departs from its foundational reasoning. Yet as we hope to show, public order is a complex and amorphous concept that accords the modern state the right to intervene in the private domain of religious belief while maintaining that it is a place of autonomy from state regulation. In what follows, we want to elaborate on this point by a close reading of three recent judgments from Egyptian administrative courts regarding Bahais in which sharia, the identity of the state, and the right to religious freedom are invoked. Of particular interest to us is how the courts uphold the constitutional right of the Bahais to religious liberty while restricting state recognition of their faith in the public domain.

**Regulation or Recognition?**

Things came to a head for Egyptian Bahais in 2004 when the government computerized the system that issues national identity cards (Human Rights Watch and Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2007). National identity cards, while crucial to the conduct of civil and political life, had been issued irregularly in the past, and local officials often allowed for the Bahai religion to be recorded on the cards. Centralizing the system produced a crisis when state computer programs did not allow for a “Bahai” entry, thereby alerting local officials of the legal violation. The government requirement also created a new vigilance among the employees of the Ministry of the Interior and its Civil Status Department (CSD) in relation to the presence of the Bahais as a demographic entity in Egypt that was unprecedented. Several Bahai families had their birth certificates, national identity cards, and other documents confiscated that listed their Bahai religion under the old system. Unable to
proceed with their daily life, these Bahais took their case to administrative courts to challenge the decision of the Ministry of Interior and CSD.\textsuperscript{12}  

Administrative Court of Justice on Bahais’ Religious Liberty  

Among these was a case brought by Husam Izzat and his wife, Ranya Rushdie. While their three daughters’ and Husam’s religious identifications were listed as “Bahai” on their official documents, Ranya’s was left blank. When the family tried to procure passports, their documents were confiscated by the Civil Status Intelligence Unit in Alexandria without explanation. After failing to retrieve these documents, the Izzat-Rushdie family filed a lawsuit in the Court of Administrative Justice against the Ministry of Interior and the CSD for violating their right to religious liberty (enshrined in Article 46 of the 1971 constitution of Egypt). On April 4, 2006, the administrative court issued a decision in favor of the Izzat-Rushdie family (hereafter cited as AC 2006a).\textsuperscript{13} The decision drew liberally on an earlier decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) issued in 1983.\textsuperscript{14} It is interesting to parse the AC 2006a decision because it lays out the state’s operative framework, one in which the “unrecognizability” of the Bahai religion is conceded while upholding the civil rights of Bahais qua citizens. The Court of Administrative Justice argued:

> Authoritative reference books on Islamic jurisprudence indicate that Muslim lands have housed non-Muslims with their different beliefs; that they have lived in them like the others, without any one of them being forced to change what they believe in; but that the open practice of religious rites was confined to only those recognized under Islamic rule. In the customs of the Muslims of Egypt this is limited to the People of the Book, that is, Jews and Christians only.

This argument weaves the language of Islamic jurisprudence with the European conception of religious liberty premised on the distinction between the right to freedom of belief and the right to manifest that belief. In this conception, even though all citizens of a polity are free to hold their private religious beliefs (\textit{forum internum}), the state has the authority to regulate and limit the manifestation of that belief in public (\textit{forum externum}) in accord with what it deems to be consonant with the polity’s social and moral order.\textsuperscript{15} Based on this reasoning, the court simultaneously asserts that Bahais cannot be forced to change their religious beliefs while subjecting the expression of these beliefs (Bahai rites and rituals) to state prohibition. Interest-
ingly, in the quotation above, the source of the right to religious liberty is not stated to be Article 46 of the Egyptian constitution that was in place at the time of the judgment. Instead, the court grounds it in the “authoritative precedents in Islamic jurisprudence.” In the absence of any specified sharia norms on the governance of non-Muslim minorities, this claim appears intended to provide assurance that the court’s interpretation of the forum internum does not infringe, and indeed finds its justification in, the norms of the majority religious tradition.

One would imagine that if, in accord with the principle of “People of the Book,” no religion other than Judaism and Christianity are allowed to exist in a Muslim polity, then the court could have outrightly rejected all Bahai claims. The court, however, does not do so. Instead, it requires the Ministry of Interior and the CSD to issue the Izzat-Rushdie family with identity cards (as their legitimate right to civil status) that states their religious affiliation as “Bahai” based on the following argument:

Islamic jurisprudence requires a disclosure that would allow [a distinction to be made] between the Muslim and non-Muslim in the exercise of social life, so as to establish the range of the rights and obligations reserved to Muslims that others cannot avail [themselves] of, for these [rights and obligations] are inconsistent with their beliefs. Thus, the obligation by the Law of Civil Status no. 143 of 1994 concerning the issuance of an identity card to every Egyptian on which appears his name and religion and the same on birth certificate is a requirement of the Islamic sharia. It is not inconsistent with Islamic tenets to mention the religion on a person’s card even though it may be a religion whose rites are not recognized for open practice, such as Bahaism and the like. On the contrary, these [religions] must be indicated so that the status of its bearer is known and so he cannot enjoy a legal status to which his belief does not entitle him in a Muslim society.

Notably, in the passage above, the court upholds the position that Bahaism is not a legitimate religion in the eyes of the state, but makes a crucial distinction between the unrecognizability of the Bahai faith in the realm of religion and their recognizability in the realm of civil affairs. In a society where the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims is central to the distribution of rights and obligations, to not recognize the Bahais, the court argues, is to make a category mistake that contravenes the state’s ability to govern. The court therefore concludes that the state is obliged to list the faith of the Bahai on the identity cards but also qualifies that this does not constitute a formal recognition of the Bahai religion. While the
court grants that non-Muslims lived under Muslim rule in which they were allowed to hold their religious beliefs, it also asserts that this does not mean that Muslims and non-Muslims are equal in the eyes of the state with respect to their rights and obligations. While Christians and Jews supposedly fare better in this logic, Bahais have a distinctly lower status in that they are not among the “People of the Book.” As such, they cannot be granted the same rights as the Christian and Jewish minority. Consequently, the court casuistically argues that it is precisely to be able to preserve the unequal status of the Bahais in a Muslim majority polity that their religion must be recorded on their civil status documents.

While the Islamic contours of this argument are apparent, it is also important to recognize how this inequality is parasitical on the distinction between the privacy of religious belief and the publicity of civil status. In other words, the AC 2006a judgment’s separation of Bahai religious beliefs from the requirements of a civil law (the religious identity of all citizens be listed on national identity cards) that governs all citizens regardless of their religious affiliation depends on a prior distinction internal to the discourse on religious liberty, namely, that between the privacy of belief and the demands of public order—a distinction that cuts across the European and Egyptian legal contexts and about which we have more to say below.

This judgment quickly went viral, and Bahais, whose faith and legal status were not well known among ordinary Egyptians, burst on the public scene with force. Some Muslim groups misrepresented the ruling as an official recognition of the Bahai religion by the state that violated the sharia. Those who defended the court’s judgment cast it as a victory for the civil and political rights of Bahai citizens. For many Bahai activists who had struggled in the anonymity of the bureaucratic maze, the judgment was a welcome relief because it solved an immediate practical problem and allowed them to make their case in public. As one leader of this movement put it: “I am as equally a citizen as any other Egyptian. Even if the state doesn’t recognize my faith, you cannot commit me to a ‘civil death’—I cannot even open a bank account without an identity card. And why would you want me to list myself as a Muslim, Christian or Jew on the card? Would this not be a lie, and would this not put me in violation of the sharia?”

Appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court

Members of the parliament from the ruling National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, despite their long-standing animosity toward each other, were unanimous in their condemnation of the decision and
moved to challenge the lower court’s ruling in the Supreme Administrative Court (Human Rights Watch and Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2007: 38). On December 2, 2006, the SAC declared that the state was prohibited from listing the Bahai faith on identity cards or birth certificates of Bahai Egyptians, effectively overturning the lower court’s earlier decision and also reversing its own 1983 judgment. In contrast with the lower court, the SAC in its 2006 decision (henceforth SAC 2006b) specifically challenges the appellant’s (Izzat-Rushdie) invocation of Article 46 of the Egyptian constitution that guarantees the right to religious freedom. The SAC focuses on the normative implications of the distinction between the right to religious belief and the right to manifest this belief in public by invoking the state’s prerogative to protect public order in distinct but intertwined ways.

The SAC grants the inviolability of freedom of belief: “It is clear that all Egyptian constitutions guaranteed the freedom of belief and the freedom of religious rites, as they constitute the fundamental principles of all civilized countries. Every human being has the right to believe in the religion or belief that satisfies his conscience and pleases his soul. No authority has power over what he believes deep in his soul and conscience.” Having granted this right, the SAC goes on to distinguish between the right to believe and the right to express this belief in public: “As to the freedom of practicing religious rites, this is subject to the limitation . . . of respecting the public order and public morals.” The court then turns to the argument that because Islamic sharia, which is foundational to the Egyptian state, does not recognize the Bahai faith, it follows that to list the Bahai faith on the national identity cards is a violation of public order: “No data that conflict with or disagree with [public order] should be recorded in a country whose foundation and origin are based on Islamic sharia.”

Several points are noteworthy in this judgment. The SAC 2006b ruling construes the listing of the Bahai religion on state-required identity cards as a manifestation of religion. This contradicts the lower administrative court’s earlier decision (AC 2006a) that had permitted the Bahai religion to be listed on the identity cards precisely as a way to limit its open practice and manifestation in public. This contradiction, we want to argue, is not simply a mistake on the part of the courts but emanates from the fraught and contested distinction between the forum internum and forum externum that is at the heart of the conceptual formulation of the right itself. What appears to be of most concern to the court in SAC 2006b is not the manifestation of Bahai practices per se in the forum externum but recognition by the state of the Bahai faith itself as a religion. This is a question that implicates the meaning and scope of
the *forum internum* itself and raises issues of status and value prior to any question of recognition or limitation on manifestations of religious belief. One important consequence of this elision is that the SAC 2006b decision in fact substantively erases the civil status of Bahais and reduces them to nothing more than heretics from the truth of Islam and to a lesser degree from Christianity and Judaism. Unlike the lower administrative court’s earlier decision that recognized the problem of the civil status of Bahais in a state that does not recognize their religion, the SAC makes no mention of how such a minority is to be governed, regulated, and categorized.

What is so challenging and difficult in the reasoning of the SAC 2006b judgment is the genuine ambiguity and oscillation between what exactly constitutes the *forum internum* and what the state should recognize or limit in the *forum externum*. Note that the SAC first agrees with the earlier argument made by the lower administrative court in AC 2006a that individual freedom of *belief* is absolute: “Every person may believe in whatever he desires from the religions and beliefs of which his consciousness assures him and with which his soul feels at peace” (SAC 2006b). However, the SAC’s construal of the freedom to have and maintain a *religion* can be read as being subject to the demands of public order in two distinct senses.

On one reading, the court can be seen as simply recognizing the freedom to manifest a particular limited category of religious beliefs (“the three heavenly religions”) in the *forum externum*. As we suggested above, this is because the relevant sharia norms are recognized to be part of the state’s public order. This approach employs the same logic as the reasoning of the lower administrative court in AC 2006a, but reaches an opposite conclusion. The public order limit is not on the manifestation of specific beliefs per se but on which religions and religious communities are recognized in the first place to practice their rituals. The implication of this view is that *all* manifestations of religion are subject to state authority and regulation and must be either recognized or accept limitation. It is primarily because Islam is the religion of the majority of the population that its rites and rituals are so freely practiced and recognized by the state. This is not responsive, however, to the argument advanced in AC 2006a that recognition on identity documents is precisely to ensure that Bahaism is not openly practiced and pertains instead to how *religious identity* bears on one’s civil status as a citizen.

This suggests another way to read the SAC 2006b judgment. What is most deeply at issue in the case is not the belief-action distinction as between the *forum internum* and *externum* but the distinction between individual belief as an inner dimension of human consciousness and reli-
gion as a discursive tradition and collective identity of distinct communities. This is a question that goes beyond public order limitations imposed on religious rites and rituals. It entails instead how the very category demarcated as “religious” in the forum internum is defined in the first place. Such a definition implicitly challenges the equation of the forum internum with individual belief alone.

Another Tactic?

The SAC decision was widely condemned by human rights organizations in Egypt, and global Bahai networks mobilized to put pressure on the Egyptian government to address this discriminatory ruling. Prominent Islamist lawyers in Egypt criticized the decision on different grounds, arguing that it created an impasse in the state’s ability to govern effectively because it compelled Bahais to list their religion as Muslim, Christian, and/or Jewish, which was tantamount to forcing Bahais to lie to the state (itself a crime) or coercing them to give up their faith, which is a violation of Islamic principles. It was precisely this contradiction that opened a window for the human rights organization Egyptian Initiative on Personal Rights (EIPR) to intervene on behalf of another Bahai family, the Rauf Hindi family, whose case was at the time pending in a lower administrative court. Since the SAC ruling could not be appealed, EIPR decided to amend its plea on the Rauf Hindi case from asking the court to allow the Bahais to list their religion on the identity card to the request that they be given the right to leave the required field blank (referred to as a “dash”). In an interview, a leading lawyer for this case commented, “This was a pragmatic decision on our part. We are principally opposed to the state requirement that Egyptians should have to declare their religious affiliation on government documents. But we knew that we would not win on the basis of such an argument. So we decided to change our appeal to force both the courts and the Muslims to face the contradictions inherent in our system and to create a space for a different kind of discussion about Bahais, namely, their civil and political status in our country.”

It turns out that EIPR’s strategy worked, and the lower Administrative Court of Justice delivered the following verdict (hereafter cited as AC 2008):

In keeping with the principle of not forcing any citizen to embrace a divine religion . . . issuing a national identity card with no space for religion or with a symbol indicating that he does not belong to any of the three divine religions . . . would conform with the law and reality. [Pursuant with the Supreme
Court decision on 1/3/1975 in case no 7/2 J] . . . the court concludes that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of belief is limited to the followers of the three divine religions and that the exercise of Bahai rites is against the public order [that is] essentially based on Islamic sharia.

The court emphasized that its judgment did not constitute a “recognition of the Bahai ideology or a way to allow its followers to record it in the space reserved for religion.” The purpose of the judgment was to prevent the greater harm that would be visited on “People of the Book” if Bahais listed their religion incorrectly as either Muslims or Christians: such an act would allow Bahais to insinuate “themselves among the members of the divine religions” that “would present a grave prejudice to the religion that will be untruly recorded” (AC 2008, 6). Notably, the public order clause is used here not only to limit the manifestations of the Bahai faith but also to define the substantive meaning of “religion.” Furthermore, the state, far from being neutral, is partisan to the majority Islamic religion, which is regarded as consubstantial with public order.

In many ways this ruling is similar to the one issued by the lower administrative court in AC 2006a (and the 1983 SAC ruling) in that it reinserts the separation between what is construed as a religious (sharia) requirement to deny formal recognition to the Bahai religion and the civil law requirement of documenting the true identity of its citizens for the purpose of governance and regulation. Recall that AC 2006a had argued that while the principle of fairness pertained to the domain of civil law (all Egyptian citizens had the right to national identity cards and the privileges that ensued from it), when it came to religious and doctrinal rulings on the status of the Bahais, the court had no jurisdiction over it. The AC 2008 judgment here follows a similar reasoning in allowing the Bahais to leave the religion space blank on the identity cards instead of requiring them to list their correct identity: while the latter runs the risk of publicly recognizing the Bahai faith, the former does not. In so doing, the court seems to close the chasm opened up between the principle of civil and political equality and the principle of religious inequality that the Egyptian state simultaneously upholds.

Whereas the AC 2008 judgment, by allowing Bahais to have national identity cards, made it possible for them to carry on their political and civic life, the blank space in lieu of their religious affiliation rendered them vulnerable to religious discrimination. Because no other religious group has this distinction, their identity cards clearly mark them as Bahais, the empty slot an indication of their deviation from the Muslim norm and for some a
sign of their apostasy from Islam. In Egypt’s increasingly sectarian climate, this is not an easy burden to carry and is a reminder that legal remedies are only partial resolutions of deep prejudices and social inequalities.

In comparison with all the other rulings on the Bahais, the AC 2008 judgment makes the clearest argument for the legal distinction between the right to religious belief guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution (forum internum) and the right to manifest this belief (forum externum). This distinction is consequential because it accords the state a margin of appreciation to limit the latter while allowing the former in the name of public order defined in accord with the majority Islamic religion. The court argues:

Although Egyptian constitutions since that of 1923 guaranteed the freedom of belief and to practice religious rites as one of the inherent rights of the human being, these constitutions drew a clear line separating these two freedoms and laid down different clauses for each of them. The freedom of belief was made absolute, but the freedom of practicing religious rites was made conditional on compliance with the public order and public morality.

The court then proceeds to define public order:

Considering that the concept of public order has no exclusive and inclusive definition, and that it changes from one society to another according to the fundamental principles included in its constitution, legislation or the customs of the majority of its population, it is clear that the conceptual elements of the public order in Egypt are drawn from the fact that it is a state whose official religion is Islam, which is the religion of the majority of the population, and from the fact that Islamic sharia is the principal source of legislation. Even though this constitutional provision addresses the legislator, other authorities of the state are [still] bound by it in the fulfillment of their duties. The state of Egypt recognizes three divine religions, that is, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and its legislation regulates the religious establishments of only these three religions.

The court notes that the concept of public order is a neutral mechanism, one that was introduced by the British colonial administrators and enshrined in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Egypt is obliged to uphold. However, the court argues that Egypt’s compliance with Article 18 of the ICCPR is conditional on “taking the provisions of the Islamic sharia into consideration,” which was made explicit at the time of the “ratification of the covenant.” The court further notes that because the public order clause gives the state the authority to
limit the expression of religious beliefs that contradict the social order and public morality of a given polity, it then follows that the Egyptian state can place limitations on the public expression of the Bahai religion because it contradicts Islam, the religion of the majority of Egyptians and therefore the basis of the nation’s social order. This line of argument, as we show below, has parallels with a number of European Court cases involving the right to religious liberty.

Notably, in the quotation above, the court specifically refers to the provisions of Article 2 of the constitution that requires “Islamic Sharia” to be the “principal source of legislation.” While this article has been interpreted mainly by the Supreme Constitutional Court, the judges opine that it equally binds the administrative court in the “fulfillment of its duties.” In the beginning of this essay we discussed the force that Article 2 commands in Egyptian law today. Given the absence of legislative or executive guidelines on the article’s implementation, the question of how sharia stipulations are to be interpreted remains an open issue. But given that sharia rules apply only to the domain of family law, what does it mean for the administrative courts to adhere to “the universal rulings and goals of sharia” in relation to matters of civil governance? Not only are the judges and the lawyers not trained to perform such an interpretive task, but there is no single sharia norm that exists historically in relation to the governance of religious minorities from non-monotheistic religious traditions. Given this ambiguity, the administrative court effectively puts the secularly trained state judges in the position of arbitrarily selecting and pronouncing on conflicting opinions from the long tradition of Islamic jurisprudence on the issue.  

The question of what is or is not sharia is fraught in another important sense. Scholars of Islamic law have increasingly come to argue that the nature of what used to be called “sharia” has radically changed in the modern period. Not only has the scope of sharia been sequestered to the domain of family law, but the entirety of social and juridical life that classical sharia assumed no longer exists (Messick 1996; Hallaq 2004, 2007). As a result, what remains of sharia norms and principles has little resemblance to what they were in the premodern period. A clear example of this is manifest in the logic deployed by the Egyptian courts regarding Bahais. On the one hand, the Egyptian constitution upholds the principle of formal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, but on the other hand, in invoking the classical concept of “People of the Book,” Egyptian courts conjure a world in which Muslims were formally and substantively superior to non-Muslims. The two systems are markedly different not only by virtue of the principle of formal
equality but in the model of governance upon which each is predicated (Mahmood 2012a, 2012b). The principle of political and civil equality is premised on the modern nation-state’s indifference to the religious, ethnic, racial, and class affiliations of its citizens (the persistence of discrimination along these lines notwithstanding). The “People of the Book” principle contradicts the formal logic of this system in that it makes the religious affiliation of a citizenry consequential to the distribution of civil and political rights. Indeed, the varying and contradictory rulings of the Egyptian courts may be seen as a product of these dueling principles. But are these contradictions unique to the Islamic character of the Egyptian state, or are similar paradoxes at play in legal traditions that are self-avowedly secular? In what follows, we consider this question by analyzing the similarities and differences between Egyptian jurisprudence and that of the European Court of Human Rights.

The Dialectics of Right and Public Order in ECHR Jurisprudence

From an international and comparative legal perspective, what is most striking about the judgments in the Bahai cases is how the logic and structure of their reasoning bears a close similarity to the religious freedom jurisprudence of the European Court. As already noted, the right to religious liberty in the ECHR, like the Egyptian tradition, is premised on distinguishing between the right to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” and the right to “manifest one’s religion or beliefs” (Articles 9[1] and [2], respectively).

The dialectic structure between the forum internum and forum externum has generated two dilemmas for the European Court. The first concerns the subject and object of the protected sphere of the forum internum. Is it the individual as subject who has the right to choose autonomously as object her own beliefs or convictions, religious or not? Or is the object instead the right to have and maintain a certain category of belief, such as conscience or faith, understood in some specified sense as unchosen? Or is it not just individuals but also groups and religious institutions as subjects who have the right to profess and maintain a comprehensive religious tradition free of sovereign interference (Danchin 2011: 675–82)?

The court has struggled with these questions, and its Article 9 case law provides no clear guidance on either the scope or the content of the forum internum. Consider the recent case of Lautsi v. Italy (2011), which involved a challenge brought by Soile Lautsi, a dual Finnish and Italian citizen, on behalf of her two minor sons against the school council of a public school in Padua. Lautsi argued that the compulsory display of crucifixes in the school’s
classrooms violated her and her children’s right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion protected in Article 9(1). The Second Chamber of the European Court agreed and found a violation of Article 9(1) on the basis that first, the “state’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any kind of power on its part to assess the legitimacy of religious convictions or the ways of expressing those convictions,” and that second, the compulsory display of crucifixes clashed with the individuals’ “secular convictions” and was “emotionally disturbing for pupils of non-Christian religions or those who professed no religion” (Lautsi, para. 31).

Central to the Second Chamber’s reasoning was the proposition that the decision to affix a crucifix to the wall of a classroom constitutes “an assessment of the legitimacy of a particular religious conviction.” The state’s decision, in other words, rested on a normative position internal to the forum internum itself and was thus entangled with the category demarcated as religious. At the same time, we can see how the court’s conception of the forum internum of Lautsi and her sons runs seamlessly together the notions of autonomy and conscience without distinguishing their different rationales and genealogies.

As is now well known, the Grand Chamber reversed this finding, construing the crucifix instead as an “essentially passive symbol” not infringing on the forum internum in either of the two senses discussed above. It did not infringe the forum internum in the latter sense, as it could not be “deemed to have an influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities.” And it did not infringe the forum internum in the former sense as it was merely a symbol, only a representation of “an inner state of belief that precedes it” (Connolly 1999: 25). It was thus being recognized by the state in the forum externum only: as part of Italy’s “civil religion” or Italian culture or, as the government of Italy itself argued before the Grand Chamber, as a (secular) symbol of tolerance, pluralism, and religious freedom. As we discuss further below, this argument provided the justification for the court’s finding that the presence of religious symbols in state schools fell within “the margin of appreciation of the respondent State.” But even though the public presence of crucifixes had been argued by the government and many Italians to be integral to the public order of the state itself, the Grand Chamber saw no need to proceed to a public order limitations analysis under Article 9(2) given its prior determination that the crucifix is only a “passive symbol” that implicitly does not infringe on the forum internum of either Lautsi or her children, each of whom remains free to “believe or not to believe.”
As many scholars have observed, the Grand Chamber’s judgment stands in tension with the court’s earlier judgment in *Dahlab v. Switzerland* in which an Islamic headscarf worn by a schoolteacher was held to be a “powerful external symbol” that could be proscribed to “protect the religious beliefs of the pupils and their parents and to apply the principle of denominational neutrality in schools” (Danchin 2011: 720–23; see also Bhuta, this issue). As it would confirm again four years later in *Sahin v. Turkey*, the court thus construes the wearing of the headscarf as an act of proselytizing when worn in a public school or university but not when the state itself officially adopts a majority religious symbol in its public schools.

In a series of recent cases, the European Court has also held that it has limited jurisdiction to review the processes, reasoning, or substantive decisions made by religious organizations within an area over which they have autonomy. In similar terms, the US Supreme Court recently recognized a “ministerial exception” to generally applicable employment discrimination laws in *EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor* (2012). The premise of such a jurisdictional approach to issues of religious autonomy is based on the notion that it is not for secular courts to make determinations on matters “strictly ecclesiastical” or involving religious teachings or orthodoxy. What again is striking here is how the US Supreme Court in *Hosanna-Tabor* draws a remarkably similar distinction to the one advanced by the European Court to justify its contradictory rulings in *Lautsi* and *Dahlab*. The US Supreme Court asserts that its prior holding in *Employment Division v. Smith* (1990) that the right to religious liberty does not require religious exemptions or accommodations from so-called neutral laws of general application was limited in that case to “outward physical acts,” whereas *Hosanna-Tabor* concerned “government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself” (*Hosanna-Tabor*, 15).

What these cases reveal is that however the content and scope of the forum internum is demarcated, courts must unavoidably make substantive judgments on what constitutes or falls within the protected category. This requires considering how any set of restrictions will seem from the internal viewpoint of the category demarcated as religious. Paradoxically then, courts must make determinations that are inescapably entangled with and premised on religious criteria and concepts in order to define a sphere “free” from state authority—a private space of exception—which ostensibly limits legislative and other forms of governmental authority.

A second dilemma then ensues from the first. Unlike the forum internum, the forum externum is subject to the state’s authority in two respects:
first, in terms of state recognition of religious practices and rites, and second, in terms of state-imposed limitations on and regulation of these practices on the grounds of public order or to protect the rights of others. This then creates a public space of exception that, as we show, is both contradictory and indeterminate (Agrama 2010: 504).

As before, the court’s dilemma has been to specify both what constitutes a recognized manifestation of religion or belief and an exceptional ground of limitation to protect public order. The latter has broadly been understood to encompass those fundamental rules, values, or principles that together define and are incorporated into the collective identity of the state itself. This conception inevitably results in privileging those majoritarian sensibilities, traditions, and customs that have become intimately linked with the legal and political order.

Thus what is within the space of exception in the *forum internum* (the category of religion, conscience, or belief) is inextricably entangled with and presumed by the right to manifest religion, conscience, or belief in the *forum externum*, while the norm delimiting the *forum internum* and defining the *forum externum* (a domain of secular freedom) is itself limited by a space of exception (the category of public order). These paradoxical and isomorphic relations generate not one but two incommensurate notions of public order that in turn create a recurring ambiguity as to whether protection of religion or belief in any case is being asserted within the space of exception of the *forum internum* or as a claim to manifestation subject to either recognition or limitation in the *forum externum*.

To see the normative implications of this double structure, consider the first Article 9 case decided by the European Court in 1993 of *Kokkinakis v. Greece*. This case has some instructive parallels with the Bahai judgments. The Greek government had prosecuted a Jehovah’s Witness for proselytism directed toward a member of the dominant religion, Christian Eastern Orthodoxy. In response to Minos Kokkinakis’s claim that Greece’s proselytism law violated Article 9 of the ECHR, the European Court held that Greece had a legitimate aim in criminalizing proselytism to protect the rights and freedoms of others, but that a distinction was needed between “proper” and “improper” proselytism (Danchin 2008).

Here, *Kokkinakis* is of interest for the difference in reasoning between two judges in the majority and dissenting opinions. For Judge S. K. Martens joining the majority, the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion of the individual protected by Article 9(i) is “absolute.” This leaves no room for interference by the state (e.g., by criminalizing proselytism), which must maintain
a position of “strict neutrality” (Kokkinakis, 13–14). Further, the argument advanced by the Greek government—that protection of public order as a ground of limitation under Article 9(2) must take account of the fact that the majority of the population is Greek Orthodox and the dominant religion is central to the identity of the Greek nation-state—must be rejected because it enforces the majority’s conception of the good, raising the danger of discrimination against members of religious minorities. Judge Martens criticizes the majority for not directly addressing this danger and deferring instead to the ambiguous proper-improper proselytism distinction (Kokkinakis, 15).

For Judge N. Valticos in dissent, however, the freedom to manifest one’s religion does not include the right to attempt “persistently to combat and alter the religion of others” (Kokkinakis 2, 8). On this view, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were a “sect . . . involved [in] . . . systematic attempt[s] at conversion and consequently an attack on the religious beliefs of others” (9–10). The case thus involved not a limitation on the right to freedom of belief on the basis of public order as suggested by Judge Martens but a genuine conflict of rights between the freedom of the proselytizer to manifest her religion and the freedom of the target of proselytism to have or maintain her religion without being subject to proselytism.

In privileging the latter claim over the former, Judge Valticos addresses a different conception of public order, one that goes not to the question of limitation of the right in the forum externum but to the very nature and scope of the right itself in the forum internum. To resolve the conflict between two competing claims of right, this reasoning tacitly relies on a privileged conception of the collective good—that of Eastern Orthodoxy as the established, majority, or dominant religion—to protect the dominant religious group from being subjected to attempts to convert them to another religion.

This oscillating tension between public order as a limitation on the right, on the one hand, and as a way to construe the meaning and scope of the right, on the other, is a recurrent theme in the European Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence. Thus in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994), the court held that injury to the religious feelings of Christian believers by a film Das Liebeskonzil (Council in Heaven) was held to violate the “peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines” (Otto-Preminger-Institut, 22, 47). Two years later in Wingrove v. United Kingdom, a case involving the British government’s refusal to permit circulation of the film Visions of Ecstasy, the court held that the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 could be limited to protect the rights of others in the case of offensive attacks on “matters regarded as sacred by
Christians” (Wingrove, 57). The former construes the right in terms of a conception of the religious tradition of the majority (Christianity) deemed essential to the public order of Austria, while the latter limits the right on the basis of a conception of public order based on the majoritarian values, sensibilities, and customs that have become intimately linked with the legal and social order (see Mahmood 2013).

The differences in reasoning between Judges Martens and Valticos are strikingly similar to those between the AC 2006a and SAC 2006b decisions in the Izzat-Rushdie case. Like Judge Martens, the lower administrative court (2006a) upholds the absolute freedom of any citizen of a polity to hold (private) religious beliefs in the *forum internum*. The freedom to manifest beliefs in the *forum externum*, however, is subject to recognition and limitation on the grounds of public order. Unlike Judge Martens, the trial judges in AC 2006a do not question the association of the values, principles, and customs of the majority religious tradition with public order as a ground of limitation. Rather, they recognize that association for the purposes of civil governance, holding that Bahaism “must be indicated so that the status of its bearer is known and so he cannot enjoy a legal status to which his belief does not entitle him in a Muslim society.” This is necessary not only to “establish the range of rights and obligations reserved to Muslims” but also, as the SAC had held in its prior 1983 judgment cited with approval by the administrative court, to “prevent any legal problems [Bahais] might face due to practicing their religion within the Muslim community.” As we noted above, the limitation of the right to manifest religion in order to protect public order is what justifies the state to record it on every citizen’s civil status and identification.

The reasoning of Judge Martens and the judges in AC 2006a is similar in two significant respects: first, both advance a conception of the *forum internum* solely in terms of individual belief, and thus nothing the state sought to do in the civil sphere was understood to interfere with individual freedom of belief; and second, both see what is at stake in the case as being a conflict between the individual’s freedom of belief and any limitations on manifestation of that belief because of the demands of public order as opposed to a genuine conflict of rights that, at a deeper level, would implicate competing conceptions of the good advanced by different religious groups (not just individuals).

The distinctly different logic in the reasoning in the SAC 2006b judgment reflects these two concerns. Like Judge Valticos in *Kokkinakis*, the SAC in 2006b refocuses the analysis on the nature and scope of the right
itself. This is a critical move, as any shift in conceptualizing the *forum internum* will impose a corresponding limit on the legislative power of the state itself. The SAC thus engages in a careful reading of the history of the development of the right to religious liberty in various Egyptian constitutions, noting, in particular, the text proposed by Lord Curzon, the foreign minister of England at the time when Egypt was under British control, which would have extended “the right to undertake . . . the rituals of any community or religion or belief . . . to . . . all the residents of Egypt.” This language was rejected in favor of the final text adopted in the 1923 constitution, which provided that “the state protects the freedom to practice religious rituals and beliefs according to the observed customs of the lands of Egypt, so long as it does not harm the public order and does not contradict morals.” The SAC further explains how the right to religious liberty must be interpreted against the normative background of Article 2 that, as the administrative court later makes the point in AC 2008, confirms that the “conceptual elements” of the Egyptian public order are “drawn from the fact that [Egypt] is a state whose official religion is Islam, which is the religion of the majority of the population, and from the fact that Islamic sharia law is the principal source of legislation.”

As we discussed at the conclusion of the section “Another Tactic?,” the ambiguity and oscillation between the various administrative courts’ judgments regarding the Bahais goes to the very heart of the conceptual architecture of the right to religious liberty. As with the question of what constitutes “conscience” in any claim for conscientious objection or what conception of “freedom from injury to religious feelings” may fall within the scope of Article 9(1) as contested in *Otto-Preminger-Institut*, the issue of what falls within the category of religion requires taking a viewpoint internal to the religious tradition itself. Broadening the *forum internum* beyond individual belief creates a different concept of the right and necessarily institutes different criteria for inclusion and exclusion.23 By reading the right to religious liberty in Article 46 against the foundational principles of the Egyptian public order as required by Article 2, the SAC in 2006b may be read as advancing a conception of the *forum internum* that extends beyond the right to freedom of individual belief and encompasses instead the three heavenly religions.24

While Bahais and presumably other members of “nonheavenly religions” retain the individual right to freedom of belief, they do not have any right to public recognition as having a “religion” within the Egyptian political order. Indeed, the Report of the State Commissioner’s Authority, which
the SAC relies on in its 2006b judgment, states that the Bahai religion, being contrary to the public order, is “completely void.” The implication of this view is that the state has no authority to revise or contravene this conception of what constitutes a religion. On this basis, the interpretation in AC 2006a of Law No. 143 of 1994 on civil status contravenes the public order by violating the forum internum of the right to religious liberty that is absolute. As the state commissioner’s report concludes, any law requiring Bahaism to be identified in the “religion” field of identity cards is unconstitutional because it infringes on “the public order and morals in which Egyptian society is rooted and on which it is built in all its parts.”

Just as Judge Valticos framed the Kokkinakis case as a conflict of rights between proselytizer and target of proselytism and employed the collective good of the majority religion to define both the scope of the right and the conception of public order employed as a ground of limitation on the activities of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, so the SAC in 2006b further relies on arguments of public order and the rights of others to justify its decision not to permit the administrative authorities to enter “Bahai” onto identity cards. In strongly polemical terms, the SAC thus speaks of the ties of the Bahai movement with “the colonialists old and new, who embrace and protect them” and of the dangers of “systematic proselytization actively deployed for the purpose of the Christianization and Judaization of Muslims under the name of Bahaism.”

The logic of this reasoning is again strikingly similar to that employed by the European Court in its post-2001 Article 9 case law. In cases such as Refah Partisi and Şahin and Dogru involving Islam, the court has advanced a wide conception of public order to encompass substantive notions of secularism and democracy. Thus in Şahin the court clearly linked the principle of secularism to the notion of militant democracy accepted in Refah Partisi to hold that the Islamic headscarf is a symbol of political Islam and thus a “genuine threat to republican values and civil peace.” And in cases such as Dahlab, Şahin, and Dogru, the court has also invoked the rights and freedoms of others to justify imposing limits on the freedom to manifest Islamic beliefs or practices. This has taken the form of protecting the right of students to be free from the display of religious symbols that individually or collectively are found to constitute an exercise of pressure, provocation, proselytizing, or propaganda. Just as in the Bahai cases, it is often difficult to disentangle these two grounds of limitation that the European Court tends to run seamlessly together (Danchin 2011: 728–31).
What is quite distinct between the European and Egyptian cases is that the former do not cite canon law or engage in theological reasoning or scriptural interpretation to justify their arguments; nor do most of the states involved espouse an explicit religious identity. Thus the detailed reasoning in AC 2008 on matters such as “the chronological lineage of [the three divine] religions in revelation from God” or allusions to apostasy are clear points of divergence in comparison with the Article 9 jurisprudence of the European Court. Their similarity consists instead in the two courts’ privileging of the majority religious sensibilities and tradition to define public order. Just as the judgment of Judge Valticos recognized the intergroup dimensions of the conflict of rights in Kokkinakis but was insensitive to the collective good of the minority religious group, so too is the SAC 2006b judgment insensitive to the rights claims of the Bahai plaintiffs by privileging the conception of the collective good of the majority religious tradition.

It may be argued that the danger of these two conceptions of public order to the promise of formal equality for religious and other minorities can be avoided in those states where there is no established or officially recognized religion. Thus the difficulty with states such as Greece or Egypt is that they constitutionally entrench a dominant religion, which necessarily creates discrimination against any nonmajority or nontraditional religious group. But this is a misunderstanding of how the concept of right is used by the state as a modern technology of secular governance.

The defining characteristic of modern secular power is that it incessantly raises the question of where to draw the line between the religious and secular and empowers the state to make this determination by demarcating the nature and scope of the right. This requires the state to constantly define and delimit what is “religious” either as an absolutely protected category in the forum internum or as a category of simultaneous recognition and regulation in the forum externum. The state thus always decides what the scope of religion should be in the political order.

As Winnifred Sullivan (2006: 923) has shown in the context of religious freedom jurisprudence under the US Constitution, American courts have over time consolidated a “protestant de facto establishment that continues to mark legal and political discourse about religion.” This takes the form of a public sphere defined strongly in terms of individual freedom of conscience while the scope of the freedom to manifest conscience is defined according to the values of the majority. In US Supreme Court cases such as Lyng (1988) and Smith (1990) involving claims by members of Native
American minority religious groups, a particular conception of religious liberty is discernible that implicitly draws on and assumes a Protestant religious subjectivity and interpretive frame (Sullivan 2005: 104). Similarly in France, Muslim and other religious minorities confront a strongly individualistic conception of the right delimited according to a substantive background conception of laïcité as public order while, as we have shown, in Turkey claims to religious freedom in cases such as Refah Partisi and Sahin confront Kemalist conceptions of secularism as public order.

The ways in which this dialectic unfolds and is negotiated across time and spatial geographies is infinitely complex and varied, and we thus see a tremendous variety of constitutional arrangements in the world today that recognize different forms of relation to both majority and minority religions. But in all modern states we can see a consistent pattern of protecting state-sanctioned traditions or dominant religions and a corresponding insensitivity to and denial of the claims of minority, nontraditional, or unpopular religious groups.

The role of the two conceptions of public order in determining (1) the nature of the right as both an exercise of and limit on state power and (2) the nature of the public sphere as either recognizing or limiting the right to manifest religious belief is integral to this calculus of modern governance. As we have shown, the terminus of this logic is the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Lautsi where Italy’s claim to have the freedom to affix crucifixes to public school classrooms was recognized by the European Court as not infringing the forum internum of schoolchildren “to believe or not to believe” while at the same time accepting the limitation of the display of Muslim signs on grounds of public order, as in Refah Partisi and Sahin.

Conclusion

In this essay, we have argued that the distinction between a putative forum internum (encompassing the category of religion or belief) and forum externum (encompassing the category of manifestation of religion or belief) and corresponding conceptions of public order either recognizing or limiting claims to religious freedom in each sphere are what underlies the striking similarities in the jurisprudence of both the Egyptian and the European courts. The dilemma of how to demarcate the meaning and scope of the forum internum has been shown necessarily to involve the courts in making substantive judgments on what falls within the protected category. We
thus saw in the Izzat–Rushdie case the different ways in which the AC 2006a and SAC 2006b judgments construct the forum internum in terms of either “belief” on the one hand or “religion” on the other understood more broadly as a discursive tradition defining not only the collective identity of distinct communities but, on the basis of Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution, the public order of the state itself.

The second dilemma of when and how the state should recognize or limit manifestations of religious belief in the forum externum was equally shown to be entangled with the forum internum and the corresponding ways in which majoritarian sensibilities, traditions, and customs have become linked with the legal and political order. This in turn generates insuperable difficulties for religious minorities to practice their beliefs and live free of discrimination. Each of the European Court cases of Kokkinakis in Greece, Dahlab in Switzerland, Ş ahin in Turkey, Dogru in France, and Lautsi in Italy reflect this tendency to privilege majoritarian religious values and sensibilities and discriminate against minority faiths. Similarly, each of the successive AC 2006a, SAC 2006b, and AC 2008 judgments advance competing understandings of this recognition-limitation dialectic of public order, holding first that Bahaism must be recorded on identity documents for the express purpose of its public order limitation; second, that the state is prohibited from recording Bahaism on identity documents because only the three heavenly religions are recognized by the Egyptian public order; and third, that the issuing of identity documents with no space for religion or simply a dash would “conform with the law and reality.” The last resolution is an implicit recognition by the courts of the irreconcilability of the contradictions inherent in each of these positions and the fact that the right to religious liberty is limited to the three heavenly religions thereby making any manifestation of Bahai rites contravene public order.

This normative structure of the right to religious liberty explains the close intertwining of the religious and the secular, whether in the Middle East or Europe, and illustrates the error in viewing these as separate or opposing worldviews. To notice these striking similarities is not to suggest that one should not be equally attentive to the substantive differences between these bodies of jurisprudence. The ways in which the sharia is understood and interpreted, for example, and the resulting normative implications for the right to religious liberty as a matter of Egyptian law raise conceptual questions markedly distinct from those at issue in Article 9 cases (Lombardi 2006). But unfamiliarity with the distinctive logic and
grammar of claims made in the language of the sharia should obscure neither the embeddedness of this legal contestation within the problem-space of modern secular power nor the use of the right to religious liberty as a technology of state governance.

Notes

The authors would like to thank Nathan Brown for his comments on an earlier version of this essay; Mona Oraby for her research assistance; and Connie Canon and Maram Salaheldin for their translation of key documents related to the Bahai court cases. This article could not have been written without the pioneering work of EIPR and the insights of Hossam Bahgat, EIPR’s director, and Adel Rafea, EIPR’s chief lawyer responsible for the Bahai cases.

1 After being banished first from Iran and later Baghdad, Bahaullah finally settled in Acre, part of Ottoman Syria, in 1868, where he remained until his death. His son subsequently took over his father’s position.

2 The Bahai World Center was initially established in Haifa in the late nineteenth century when it was still a part of Palestine. Bahaullah’s son, following his father’s wishes, had the remains of Bab (whom the Bahais believe to be a messiah) transferred from Iran to Haifa, which became a pilgrimage center for the Bahais.

3 A challenge to the law (263/1960) in the Constitutional Court was an appeal rejected on the grounds that the practice of Bahai religion presented a threat to public order and therefore could not be accorded constitutional protection (reserved for Islam, Christianity, and Judaism).

4 Egypt and Israel formally went to war in 1967, but the animosities between the two states reached a climax in 1956 over Israeli access to the Suez Canal under President Nasser.

5 The first recorded instance of this reasoning occurs as early as 1948 when a Bahai state employee married to a Bahai woman was denied family and child allowance. He took his case to the administrative court and argued that, like Christians and Jews, he was a protected citizen of the state (dhimmi), which entitled him to claim the family and child allowance. The court rejected his case on the ground that insofar as Islam was the religion of the state (according to the 1923 constitution), under the sharia Bahais could not claim the dhimmi status that was reserved only for Christians and Jews (Pink 2003: 421).

6 Currently in Egypt, of the fifteen religious communities of Muslims, Christians, and Jews recognized by the state, nine religion-based family laws are on the books.

7 The Coptic Orthodox Church successfully lobbied to have Article 3 added to the 2012 constitution that enshrines the right of the Jews and Christians to have autonomy over their own religion based family laws. While this was the practice before, it is now their constitutional right.

8 We are grateful to Nathan Brown for pointing this out.

9 Article 2 was introduced for the first time in 1971 in the Egyptian constitution that made Islamic sharia “a” source of legislation. This itself was a radical departure from Article 149 of the constitution (in place since 1923) that had loosely asserted that “Islam is the religion of the state” without ever making it clear what this meant in practice. It was in 1979 that President Anwar Sadat further modified Article 2 to make the sharia the chief source of Egyptian legislation.
Anver Emon (2012: 73) in his book on *ahl al-dhimma*, for example, writes: “When Muslims conquered Persia and encountered Zoroastrians, commanders allowed the local religious population there to reside peacefully in the empire and maintain their faith, as long as they paid the *jizya* [poll tax]. Likewise in India, when Muslims conquered that region, polytheists were allowed to pay the *jizya* and live a ‘tolerated’ existence under Muslim rule. . . . Although all these groups were able to live peacefully within the Muslim empire on condition of payment of *jizya*, the People of the Book were held in higher esteem than others.”

Hussein Agrama’s (2012) work shows that this equally applies to cases pertaining to Muslims when it comes to regulating their religious affairs.

For an account of these court cases, see Human Rights Watch and Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2007: 30–37.

Case 24044 of the forty-fifth judicial year, issued on April 4, 2006. For a translation of this judgment, see www.bahai.org/persecution/egypt/2006april_en. Throughout this essay, we have used this translation at times modified by Mahmood to adjust for legal terms and idiomatic phrases.

The Supreme Administrative Court case no. 1109/29, issued on January 29, 1983.

While the 1923 Egyptian constitution had referred to this distinction explicitly, it was dropped in the constitution drafted in 1953. The state commissioner’s report to the Supreme Administrative Court in the *Izzat-Rushdie* case (2006) as well as the court’s decision (discussed below) cite this history.

Bahai activist (name withheld to preserve confidentiality), interview with Saba Mahmood, October 2008, Cairo, Egypt.

Cases 16834 and 18971 of the fifty-second judicial year, issued on December 16, 2006. We have used the following translation, info.bahai.org/pdf/EGYPTSAC_16DEC06_ENGLISH.pdf (modified by Mahmood).


Case 18354 of the fifty-eighth judicial year, issued on January 29, 2008.

The ruling in AC 2008 is expressly restricted to those Bahais “to whom birth certificates or identity cards had previously been issued with ‘Bahai’ mistakenly mentioned in the space reserved for religion or . . . with a dash in the said space.”

Notably, in the 2012 post-Mubarak constitution, Article 4 was introduced for the first time. It requires religious scholars form the University of al-Azhar be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law, a requirement that may well pitch the legislative and executive branches of the government against al-Azhar in a battle over the meaning and scope of the sharia. For early signs of this struggle, see Ali and Brown 2013. For a cogent analysis of Article 4 and others pertaining to Islamic law in the new Egyptian constitution, see Lombardi and Brown 2012.

Obst v. Germany, no. 425/03, September 23, 2010; Lombardi-Valluari v. Italy, no. 39128/05, October 20, 2009; Scuith v. Germany, no. 1620/03, September 23, 2010.

This line of inclusion/exclusion is an inescapable consequence of the double structure of the right to religious liberty. Whatever is held to fall within the *forum internum* is to be regarded normatively differently to what falls both outside it and within the *forum externum*. It is this apparent inequality of treatment between the “religious” and “non-religious” that leads many contemporary theorists to abandon the tradition altogether in favor of some other overriding principle such as autonomy, which privileges not free-
dom of religion, conscience, or even belief but freedom of choice. See Sandel 1998; Leiter 2012.

24 The Report of the State Commissioner provides explicit support for this interpretation. As regards Article 2 of the constitution, the report states that “the religion of Islam is both a creed [belief system] and a law [way] combining doctrines of belief and systemic rules and is not limited to 'ibadat [worship of God] but also regulates the mu'amalat [the interaction and exchange between people]. Thus, it is not proper to resort to this religion as a belief without resorting to it as a law, for the matter of the doctrines of belief is the matter of the systemic rules, each following the sharia of Islam taken from the Holy Qur'an and the honorable Sunna, and in accordance with this, the State, if the constitution did not say that Islam was its religion, would be required to draw from the rulings of this true religion in its doctrinal and systemic aspects.”

References


